The objective of the present study is 
I. Introduction
The expansion of microfinance sector is based on the concept that poor households are affected by lack of access to, and inadequate provision of financial services. This attempt to reduce the rate of financial exclusion among the poor was seen as an alternative solution for the failures in agricultural lending and rural credit assistance practices marred by substantial subsidies, urban biased credit allocation, higher transaction costs, high default rates, corrupt practices and misaligned incentives (Arun et al., 2005) . Despite the exceptional growth of the microfinance sector during the last three decades in serving around 40 million clients, most parts of the developing world would still remain characterised by huge demand for micro financial services.
There is a projection about the potential of this market to grow to $250-$300 billion in the near future from the existing loan portfolio of $17 billion in mid-2006 (Ehrbeck, 2006) . The concept and practice of microfinance have changed dramatically over the last decade and the microfinance sector is increasingly adopting a financial systems approach, either by operating on commercial lines or by systematically reducing reliance on interest rate subsidies and/or aid agency financial support (Hulme and Arun 2009 ). The financial systems approach supports the argument that microfinance institutions should aim for sustainable financial services to low income people, which may risk undermining the potential of institutional innovation for poverty reduction and social empowerment. According to Cull et al. (2009) , the argument that microfinance institutions should seek profits has an appealing 'win-win' resonance, admitting little trade-off between social and commercial objectives.
Irrespective of the renewed emphasis on the financial systems approach, over the years, many Micro Finance Institution (MFIs) have developed a range of services to address the 3 requirements of the poor, such as the Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development (IGVGD) programme of BRAC, Bangladesh. Despite the widely held belief among policy makers that microfinance has a relatively small impact on poverty at macro level, some recent studies have shown its significant effect on poverty using household survey data. Using the panel data at both participant and household levels in Bangladesh, Khandker (2005) confirms that microfinance programmes have a sustained impact in reducing poverty among the participants, especially for female participants and a positive spill over effect at village level. This study suggests that microfinance programmes not only help the poor or redistribute income but also contribute to national economic growth. However, some studies have shown that MFIs have not reached the poorest of the poor in Asian countries (Weiss and Montgomery, 2005) or in Bolivia (Mosley 2001) . The challenge in serving the poorest of the poor is to identify who might benefit from stand-alone financial services or from non-financial services with or without finance, before participating in market-oriented finance (Meyer 2002) . In Bangladesh, Rutherford (2003) found that despite the widespread presence of MFIs, their share of total money management activities is relatively small. This indicates the need for microfinance institutions to move away from being product-based organizations to reflect the heterogeneity of the demand structure for financial services/products by poor.
The relationship between microfinance and poverty is still in question and this paper provides some new empirical evidence on the poverty-reducing effects of MFIs. The existing studies on the impact of microfinance provide inconclusive results ranging from a substantial positive impact in Bangladesh to 'zero' effect in northern Thailand (Cull et al., 2009 ). This study argues that the future innovations in the microfinance sector will be reflective to the fresh 4 understandings of the financial lives of the poor households. To capture the multi-dimensional aspect of poverty, such as basic needs, wealth, type of housing, job security, sanitation and food security, the current study uses Index Based Ranking 1 (IBR) Indicators based on a national-level household survey to examine the role of microfinance in poverty reduction in India.
In India, despite recent economic growth at national level 2 , poverty remains a serious problem for policy-makers because the high economic growth is mainly driven by few sectors in urban areas, such as industry and service sectors 3 . The incidence of poverty in India is estimated by quinquennial large sample surveys on household consumption and expenditure and, according to the Uniform Recall Period (URP) consumption distribution data, poverty stands at 28. Until the early 1990s, financial services were provided through a variety of state sponsored institutions, which resulted in impressive achievements in expanding access to credit particularly among the rural poor (Mosley and Arun 2003) . Although many of these commercial bank branches in rural areas were unprofitable, they played a positive role in financial savings and 1 In spite of well established concerns on IBR class of poverty measures such as subjectivity, substitutability and complementary issues of multi-dimensional poverty and stochastic dominance, we remain resolute on its reliability based on some earlier wealth ranking studies including Adams et al. (1997) and Pradhan and Ravillion (2000) . 2 For example, real GDP grew by 9.7 % in 2007, 9.2% in 2008, and 6.7% in 2009. 3 The average annual output growth rates in industry and services sectors in the period 1994-2004 are 5.6% and 8.2% respectively, while that in the agricultural sector is 2.0% (based on World Bank Data in 2005 taken from http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/ind_aag.pdf. The poverty head count ratio has been much higher in rural areas than in urban areas (e.g. Deaton and Kozel 2005 and Sen and Himanshu 2004) .
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reducing poverty. This is evident from the fact that during the period 1951-1991 the financial institutions' total share in rural household debt increased from 8.8 per cent to 53.3 per cent and the role of money lenders declined significantly (Mosley and Arun 2003; Basu and Srivastava 2005) . However, despite the vast network of banking and cooperative finance institutions and strong micro components in various programmes, the performance of the formal financial sector still fails to adequately reach out to, or reflect and respond to the requirements of the poor.
In the 1990s, MFIs became increasingly important in India mainly due to their better access to local knowledge and information at community level and their use of peer group monitoring. For example, microfinance programmes involving SHGs (Self-Help Groups), which are based on the existing banking network in delivering financial services to the poor, have become increasingly important in India due to their flexible nature (Mosley and Arun 2003) .
SHGs are built on the traditional institution of ROSCA (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations) and provide access to both savings and credit for the asset-less poor. A recent study in Pune district in Maharashtra showed that while the targeting performance of microfinance through SHGs was unsatisfactory in terms of income, it was satisfactory in terms of caste (social division based on descent or birth), landlessness and illiteracy and thus facilitated the empowerment of women (Gaiha and Nandhi 2007) . This study also found that loans were used largely for children's health and education and argued against restricting the impact assessment of microfinance to conventional economic criteria alone.
Despite MFIs' increasing involvement in poverty reduction in India, there have been relatively few studies that empirically evaluate their impact at the national level. The present study aims to provide evidence on the relationship between role of MFIs and its impact on 6 poverty in India using a large-scale household data set which was collected with the intention of assessing the impact of microfinance. In our study, poverty is defined by the 'IBR (Indexed Hence it is necessary to take into account self-selection problems or the endogeneity associated with participation in microfinance programmes.
To address at least partly the sample selection problem, we apply treatment effects model, a version of the Heckman sample selection model (Heckman, 1979) . We have carried out robustness test by using propensity score matching (PSM). 5 We also use Tobit estimation to estimate the effect of size of productive loan on poverty. Tobit model is meant to account for left censoring associated with unobserved sample. Other robustness checks explored include (1) 7 decomposition of the IBR index into perception of income level and food security 6 and (2) examining whether poverty reducing effects of productive loan would be observed in the case where it is replaced by total loan. In all instances, we observe that microfinance has a significant positive effect on poverty reduction.
The treatment effects model estimates the probit model with the same specification as in the first stage of PSM. In the second stage, the IBR indicator, our proxy for poverty, is estimated by OLS while sample selection is corrected by using estimates of the probability of participation in microfinance programmes. The model is fitted by a full maximum likelihood (Maddala, 1983) .
The merits of the treatment effects model over PSM include that (i) the degree of sample selection bias is explicitly taken into account and (ii) the determinants of the dependent variable in the second stage are identified. However, the treatment effects model imposes strong distributional assumptions for the functions in both stages and the final results are highly sensitive to the choice of explanatory variables and the instrument. The presence of unobservable variables would also affect the results as in PSM. Given these limitations, applying different models is useful as each model serves to check the robustness of the results derived by the other.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II summarises the survey design and data. Section III describes the econometric intuition underlying treatment effects and Tobit model. Section IV provides the econometric results and main findings. The concluding remarks are given in the final section.
6 These two components are deemed only candidates for decomposition analysis given the data limitations, e.g. insensitivity of other components in IBR, such as land-holding or household access to sanitation facilities, to microfinance access or loan amount. The choice of these proxies was also guided by the data generation process since each provides either subjective or objective view points of wellbeing. The hypothesis of our study is: (1) access to microfinance institutions (MFIs) and productive loan reduces poverty and (2) amount of productive loan has a poverty reducing effect. Incidentally, the share of 'the poor' and 'the very poor' (28.7%) in our study matches, the poverty head count ratio for all India in 2004-5 based on the national poverty line applied to the National Sample Survey data (Himanshu, 2007) .
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II. Survey Design and Data
Descriptive Statistics and Definitions of the Variables
The present study employs two different definitions of access to MFIs; (a) whether a household is a client of any MFI ("MFI_Access") or not, and (b) whether a household has taken a loan from MFI for a productive activity ("MFI_Productive"). The first definition is used to observe the effect of simply accessing MFI on poverty. 9 The second is concerned with whether the household has taken loans for productive activities (and has an outstanding balance of those loans at the time of survey), leading to an increase in production, e.g. buying inputs for agriculture or investment in non-farm business, such as repairing a shop. This is based on borrowers' broad perception of the use of loans taken from MFIs. In this category, the loan used for self consumption or non-productive purposes is excluded. The binary classification of 'whether the household used the MFI loans for productive purposes' is based solely on the respondents' perception of the nature of their loans and thus the possibility cannot be ruled out that loans were actually used for other purposes. Thus, caution is needed in interpreting the results.
Appendix 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables for the sample households with access to MFIs and for those without. As shown by the number of observations in two columns (third and sixth), about three quarters of the sample households have access to MFIs in both rural and urban areas. About a half of them has access to loans from MFI for productive purposes.
In general, there is a relatively small difference between the descriptive statistics of each variable for the households with access to MFIs (or with access to MFI loans for productive purposes) and for those without, except in a few cases (e.g. there are higher proportions of larger households with lower dependency ratios and households with non-farm business opportunities among those receiving MFI loans than among those without). That is partly because of the design of the sample survey where households with relatively similar characteristics are chosen in each village. The higher proportion of female-headed households probably indicates that MFIs 12 use sex of the head of household for targeting female/poorer clients. For most rural households, the household head is either illiterate or 'completed primary school' only, while all of those in urban areas completed only primary school.
A household typically has about five members. About 30% of the sample households belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe (population groupings based on descent or birth and are explicitly recognized by the Constitution of India). The proportion of Hindus is relatively higher in urban areas, while that of Muslims is relatively higher in rural areas. Other religions include Christianity and Sikhism. We created a variable on 'business availability', the availability of non-farm business opportunities for households. It is assumed that more business opportunities will increase the demand for microfinance. This is proxied by the proportion of households engaged in non-farm business in a village. As expected, it is higher in urban areas.
The average IBR indicator of households in rural areas is lower than in urban areas, implying that poverty is more severe in rural areas. The IBR indicator is higher for those with access to MFIs (or those with access to MFI loans for productive purposes) than those without. However, this may not necessarily imply that access to MFIs reduces poverty due to the possible sample selection biases. The next section will address the methodologies by which the treatment effects and Tobit models take account of sample selection biases and censoring respectively.
III. Methodology
We use the treatment effects model for the effect of access to MFIs and productive loans on poverty reduction. While this approach addresses sample selection issues, we check for robustness using Propensity Score Matching and report its findings in Appendices 2 and 3.
13 Secondly, we apply Tobit regression to investigate the poverty reducing effect of productive loan amount.
(1) Treatment effects Model We employ the treatment effects' model version of the Heckman sample selection model (Heckman, 1979) , which estimates the effect of an endogenous binary treatment. This enables us to compensate for sample selection bias associated with access to MFIs. In the first stage, access to MFI is estimated by a probit model. In the second, we estimate the IBR indicator by various household characteristics and a dummy variable on whether the household participates in the MF programme after controlling for the inverse Mill's ratio which reflects the degree of sample selection bias. The instrument used is the availability of formal banks 10 at the village level (proxy for the level of local financial services) which determines the demand for microfinance, but would not directly affect the poverty level of the household.
The merit of the treatment effects model is that sample selection bias is explicitly estimated by using the results of the probit model. However, its weak aspects include (i) strong assumptions being imposed on distributions of the error terms in the first and the second stages,
(ii) the results being sensitive to the choice of explanatory variables and instruments, and (iii)
valid instruments rarely found in non-experimental data.
The selection mechanism by the probit model above can be more explicitly specified as (e.g. Greene, 2003) :
10 Hausman test has been carried out to compare the coefficient estimates of treatment effects model and those of OLS to test the validity of 'availability of formal banks' as an instrument. The instrument is deemed valid on the ground that its coefficient estimate is statistically significant in the treatment effects model and the difference of coefficient estimates of these two models are also significant as shown by Hausman test. The linear outcome regression model in the second stage is specified below to examine the determinants of poverty, proxied by IBR (index based ranking) score or i W . That is,
where θ is the average net wealth benefit of participating in MF programmes. i Z is the same as i X except that it does not include instruments for the MFI participation equation.
Using a formula for the joint density of bivariate normally distributed variables, the expected IBR indicator for those with access to MFIs (or clients) is expressed as:
where φ is the standard normal density function. The ratio of φ and Φ is called the inverse Mill's ratio.
The expected IBR for non-clients is:
The expected effect of poverty reduction associated with MFI access is computed as (Greene, 2003, 787-789) :
If ρ is positive (negative), the coefficient estimate θ of using OLS is biased upward (downward) and the sample selection term will correct this. Since ε σ is positive, the sign and significance of the estimate of ε ρσ (usually denoted as λ β ) will show whether any selection bias exists. To estimate the parameters of this model, the likelihood function given by Maddala (1983, 122 ) is used where the bivariate normal function is reduced to the univariate function and the correlation ρ . The predicted values of (5) and (6) are derived and compared by the standard t test to examine whether the average treatment effect or poverty reducing effect is significant.
(2) Tobit Model
In our bid to estimate the effect of productive loan amount on household poverty, non-zero values occur only when the former has been accessed by a household. This generates a censored sample in which Maddala (1983) and Amemiya (1984) argue that estimating least squares on the reduced sample leads to biased and inconsistent results. The other alternative of categorizing the dependent variable into a binary outcome, masks actual predictions since the use of either logit or probit reveals estimates premised on the probability that the dependent variable lies above a certain threshold. Tobit (hybrid between probit and least squares) uses information on all observations. The model takes the form:
where is the dependent variable, is the vector of independent variables, is the vector of unknown coefficients, represents the independently distributed error term. Underlying the estimation of equation (8), is a latent variable which is assumed to be linearly related to the vector of independent variables. In effect we calculate the normalized coefficients which needs to be multiplied by the standard error to ascertain the actual sort for estimates.
IV. Results
(1) Treatment Effect Model
We first provide the probit results for the treatment effects model to investigate the impacts of access to MFIs and productive loans on poverty. Because of the fundamental differences of environment, industrial structures, household characteristics and activities between urban and rural areas, we first derive the estimations for total households and then for urban areas and rural areas separately. The results of the probit model imply the sort of characteristics which are the key determinants underlying access to, and use of, microfinance services.
The estimation results of the probit model in Table 1 are generally intuitive in the case of all households where the dependent variable is 'MFI_Access' (i.e. Case A-1). A household with an older household head is more likely to be an MFI client, but the negative coefficient of the 18 age square suggests a non-linear effect, which is significant for both total and rural households.
Also, a household with a female head is more likely to be a client, which reflects the fact that microfinance programmes target women. Education variables are not significant. Dependency ratio has a negative and significant effect. The coefficient estimate of 'business availability' is positive and significant in Cases A-1 (total) and A-3 (rural areas). If a household deals with formal banks, it is less likely to be an MFI client. This is significant in Cases A-1 and A-3. The coefficient estimates of loans from formal banks, money lenders, friends and relatives are negative, which reflects the fact that those who cannot obtain loans, or can only obtain smaller loans 11 , tend to use MFI services. The availability of formal banks is positive and significant in urban areas and negative and significant in rural areas. That is, households in areas where formal banks are not available are more (less) likely to be MFI clients in rural (urban) areas.
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However, in Case B-1 where 'MFI_Productive' is estimated, a few differences are observed. The coefficient estimate of 'Female' (headedness) is negative in Case B-1 (total) and Case B-3 (rural areas), that is, a household with a male head is more likely to take a loan for productive purposes. This may reflect the fact that, although microfinance focuses on women, male-headed households are more likely to take loans for productive purposes. The coefficient estimates of variables on 'Education' are positive and significant. Households with more educated heads are more likely to take MFI loans for productive purposes, while education does 11 Average loan size for the current study is about USD600, compared with global average of about USD530 (MIX, 2009) . 12 We estimated the treatment effects model based on the probit without the variables on access to other financial services for both 'MFI-Access' and 'MFI-Productive' noting that these may not be exogenous.
The coefficient estimates of variables show similar results in the cases without the variables on access to other financial services. The final results of the treatment effects model and PSM model are also similar. However, this has a shortcoming of not controlling for the variables on other financial services and thus we decided to present the cases with these variables.
not matter for simple access to MFI. The coefficient estimates of 'Caste_dum' (dummy for caste) are negative and significant in Case B-1 and Case B-3. That is, households which do not belong to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes are more likely to be MFI clients, suggesting the exclusion of socially disadvantaged groups from MFI loans for productive purposes. The availability of non-farm business is highly significant in all cases as this increases the demand for loans for productive purposes. In rural areas transactions with formal banks and loans from money lenders show positive and significant signs, that is, other financial services serve as complements to MFI loans for productive services. On the other hand, the coefficient estimate of loans from formal banks is negative and significant in Case B-2 for urban areas. That is, those who cannot get loans from the formal banks tend to obtain MFI loans for productive purposes in urban areas. Formal bank availability at village level is negative and significant in Case B-1 (total) and Case B-3 (rural areas). Rural households living in a village with more difficult access to formal banks are more likely to take MFI loans.
(Table 1 to be inserted around here)
Based on the regression results of the probit model in Table 1 , we estimate treatment effects models and present the results in Table 2 for the total sample and for urban and rural areas, The last panel of Table 2 shows the treatment effects or the average poverty reducing effects in accessing MFIs or taking loans for productive purposes. In both instances (access to MFIs and productive loan) and for both urban and rural areas significant average poverty reducing effects are observed. Incidentally, the results on the size and sign of the poverty reducing effects in each case are very similar to those derived by kernel matching for PSM. This would support our results based on PSM with the caveat that both methodologies have their own limitations. That is, on average, having access to MFI or taking loans from MFI reduces poverty (see Appendices 2 and 3). 13 In each of the cases, the decomposed IBR indicators of perceived income level and food security show significant average poverty reducing effect.
(2) Tobit Regression Results
The sample for regressing amount of productive loan on well being was restricted only to households that had access to microfinance institutions and productive loan. The results are presented in Table 3 .
(Tables 3 to be inserted around here)
Given the outcome of the effect of sample selection above, the results emerging from the Tobit estimation shows a highly significant positive relationship between productive loan amount and 13 See Imai and Arun (2008) for details of the methodologies and results of PSM.
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households poverty after controlling for socio-economic characteristics. It is noted that the coefficient estimate of amount of productive loan, though its absolute value is small, is more highly significant in urban area (at 1 % level) than in rural area (significant only at 10 % level).
The results of other covariates are not much different from the second stage results of Treatment effects model in Table 2 . It has been confirmed that larger amount of productive loan improves well-being, a finding consistent with the underlying thrust of microfinance evolution. It is noted that this finding supports the earlier results both from the treatment effects model PSM.
Also as a form of robustness check, we observe a significant poverty reducing effect in the case of total loans. The results are shown in Table 4 .
(Tables 4 to be inserted around here)
A similar pattern of the results are obtained in the cases where we estimate the effects of amount of total loan on poverty. That is, larger amount of productive loan reduces poverty in both urban and rural areas. It is noted that coefficient estimate of total loan is significant at 1 % level in both urban and rural areas. MFIs. In urban areas, on the contrary, simple access to MFIs has larger average poverty-reducing effects than taking loans from MFIs for productive purposes.
V. Conclusions
The finding of this study provides further impetus to the existing evidences on the impact of microfinance institutions on the household poverty. In rural areas, while significant poverty reducing effects are observed in all cases, taking loans for productive purposes has a larger impact in raising the IBR indicator for those above the poverty threshold. That is, clients' intended use of loans is important in determining poverty reduction outcomes. In the context of 'profit-making poverty reduction' era, the finding on outreach and productive use of loan for better impact warrants more policy choices. Although many microfinance institutions have moved on to reflect the heterogeneity of the demand structure for financial services/products by poor, there is yet to develop a consistent framework to monitor the usage of loan with adequate 24 flexibility to capture different levels of participating nature of the households. This leads to further options in the delivery of services such as the integration of non-financial services solely or in partnership with other development agencies that provides an additional avenue to monitor the usage of loans and enhance the outreach. The challenge lies in how to design an optimal mix of delivery options to enhance the impact and outreach that determines the nature and character of the microfinance institutions in the coming years. Notes: 1) ** = significant at 1% level. * = significant at 5% level. + = significant at 10% level.
2) Education is dropped in case of urban areas as there is no variation in the variable.
3) District Dummy Variables are included, but not shown in this table Notes: ** = significant at 1% level. * = significant at 5% level. + = significant at 10% level and values in parenthesis are the z-values. 
